












Managing	secrecy	and	access	to	official	 information	 is	an	 important	exercise	of	executive	power	
that	 is	 no	 less	 crucial	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 EU	 than	 that	 of	 its	 Member	 States.	 The	 EU’s	
constitutional	(and	ultimately	legislative)	reponse	twenty	five	years	ago	in	the	Treaty	of	Maastricht	
placed	explicit	limits	on	EU	administrative	secrecy,	also	in	innovative	ways.	This	catapulted	the	EU	
to	 the	 global	 vanguard	 in	 terms	 of	 transparency	 and	 public	 access	 to	 documents.	 The	 logic	 of	
transparency	implies	that	all	arms	of	government	–	the	executive,	the	entire	public	administration	
as	well	as	parliaments	–	should	be	subject	to	the	requirement	of	openness	or	public	access.1	The	
deeper	 democratic	 inspiration,	 as	 put	 by	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 in	 Turco,	 of	 why	 openness	 and	
transparency	 are	 important	 is	 that	 of	 greater	 citizen	 participation	 and	 of	 more	 sustained	
accountability	of	 legislative	processes.	This	 is	why	the	concepts	of	openness	and	of	transparency	
were	 included	 in	 the	 political	 system	 of	 the	 EU.2	 Democracy	 reaches	 beyond	 elections,	 to	 the	
possibility	of	citizens	and	civil	society	to	follow	discussions	in	real	time	and	to	debate	them	in	an	
open	fashion.	This	presumes	knowledge	of	the	choices	and	compromises	that	are	being	and	have	
been	 made	 in	 decision-making	 process	 and	 the	 arguments	 raised	 for	 and	 against	 particular	
options.	
The	 apex	 in	 terms	 of	 EU	 transparency	 legislation	was	 2001	with	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 Access	 to	
Documents	Regulation	1049/2001.3	Since	then	it	has	been	applied,	challenged	and	interpreted	by	
the	 courts	 in	 Luxembourg.	 Even	 if	 commentators	 have	 pointed	 to	 a,	 at	 times,	 mixed	 judicial	

















Court’s	 rulings	 on	 legal	 advice),5	 the	 Regulation	 provided	 an	 accessible	 tool	 for	 the	 public	 to	
challenge	secretive	administrative	practices	of	one	kind	or	another.	Over	time	various	members	of	
the	public	have	used	the	Regulation	as	a	means	of	challenging	the	increasingly	political	practices	of	
the	 various	 institutions.6	 The	 active	 engagement	 of	 the	 European	 Ombudsman	 provides	 an	
additional	route	both	for	individual	and	more	systemic	scrutiny,	despite	being	dependent	on	the	
goodwill	of	 the	 Institutions	 to	bring	about	change.	Considerable	progress	has	undoubtedly	been	
made,	 also	 in	 arenas	 that	 are	 not	 strictly	 administrative	 in	 nature,	 such	 as	 the	 negotiations	 of	
international	agreements	by	the	EU.7		
But	gaps	have	remained,	especially	when	it	comes	to	the	way	in	which	legislation	is	adopted	at	the	
European	 level.	 This	 is	 by	 no	 means	 a	 new	 problem	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 democracy	 and	
democratic	input	from	the	different	governance	levels.	Some	national	parliaments	–	especially	the	
House	 of	 Lords8	 –	 have	 long	 drawn	 attention	 to	 various	 practices	 that	 restrict	 access	 to	
information	 during	 the	 legislative	 process,	 which	 for	 them	 is	 highly	 problematic	 from	 the	
perspective	of	holding	their	own	government	representatives	in	Council	to	account.	The	paradox	is	
that	 this	 problem	 seems	 to	 have	 intensified	 in	 recent	 years	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Treaty	 of	
Lisbon	aimed	to	make	the	EU	more	explicitly	democratic	and	transparent	and	even	includes	a	new	
Treaty	chapter	on	democracy	in	the	EU.9	This	paper	focuses	on	this	paradox	and	the	ways	in	which	





finally	 ratified.	At	 that	 time,	 the	Member	States	“clutched	at	 transparency	as	a	solution	without	
thinking	 through	 the	 consequences	 for	 interinstitutional	 relations.	 In	 advocating	 transparency,	
they	inadvertently	made	interinstitutional	reform	even	more	pressing.”10	The	nettle	remains	to	be	

























directly	 accessible	 on	 the	 internet,11	 seemingly	 allows	 itself	 in	 practice	 to	 be	 dominated	 by	 its	
legislative	partner	and	to	accept	a	restrictive	disclosure	policy.	The	concepts	of	transparency	and	
of	 efficiency	 are	 it	 seems	 warring	 concepts	 and	 right	 now	 in	 institutional	 practice	 efficiency	 is	
winning	battles	if	not	yet	the	war.	
The	challenges	are	not	small.	Who	controls	the	information	that	is	part	of	the	legislative	processes	
and	 is	 the	 process	 as	 a	whole	 under	 control?	 At	 its	 core	 is	 the	manner	 in	which	 supranational	
institutions	and	their	respective	preparatory	bodies	determine,	 in	their	own	internal	rule	making	
processes	and	 interinstitutional	 arrangements,	 the	parameters	of	openness	or	 secrecy	 in	 lieu	of	
detailed	 and	 adopted	 secondary	 legislation,	 and	 how	 these	 arrangements	 comply	 with	






is	 frequently	 used	 for	 breaking	 ground	 also	 in	 special	 legislative	 procedures.	 Prior	 to	 the	





political	 importance	 that	 receive	 priority	 treatment	 in	 the	 legislative	 process.	 According	 to	
Commission	President	 Junker,	 these	are	“initiatives	of	major	political	 importance	 that	should	be	
fast-tracked	in	the	legislative	process”.	14	Both	transparency	campaigners	and	corporate	lobbyists	
seem	to	agree	that	more	and	more	EU	 lawmaking	 is	being	pushed	out	of	public	view.15	 It	 is	not	
surprising	that	issues	relating	to	legislative	transparency	have	also	surfaced	in	recent	Court	cases16	
but	 also	 in	 enquiries	 by	 the	 European	 Ombudsman.17	 Section	 3	 	 assesses	 some	 of	 the	 current	
challenges	relating	to	legislative	documents	that	are	still	stuck	in	a	twilight	zone,	in	particular	given	
the	 legislative	 deadlock	 on	 an	 updated	 transparency	 regulation.	 These	 challenges	 relate	 to	 the	
opacity	 of	 Council	 and	 Member	 State	 positions,	 legal	 advice	 and	 the	 so-called	 four-column	
























applied	 and	 received	 access	 to	 the	 three	 institutions’	 pleadings	 in	 the	 closed	 cases	 relating	 to	
legislative	matters	before	the	EU	Courts.	The	pleadings	are	used	to	illustrate	how	the	institutions	
argue	about	transparency	in	concrete	cases.	The	institutional	thinking	illustrated	by	the	pleadings	
is	 significant	 also	 for	 the	 reason	 that	 we	 find	 the	 influence	 of	 Court	 jurisprudence	 relating	 to	
legislative	matters	limited;	in	many	cases	institutional	practices	have	continued	largely	unchanged	
despite	 rulings.	 Our	 interest	 also	 relates	 to	 institutional	 thinking	 and	 how	 it	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	
actual	 mundane	 administrative	 practice.	 In	 other	 words,	 we	 address	 the	 EU’s	 transparency	
framework	in	the	context	of	its	daily	application,	beyond	the	Court’s	jurisprudence.		
Finally,	in	section	4	we	draw	some	conclusions.	While	we	do	not	believe	that	every	single	part	of	
the	 legislative	 procedure	 should	 be	 fully	 transparent,	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 analyzing	 how	 this	
balance	 is	drawn	and	to	suggest	who	should	be	responsible	 for	drawing	 it.	Who	exercises	 these	
fundamental	 choices	 and	 the	 process	 by	 which	 these	 decisions	 are	 reached	 are	 of	 paramount	
salience	 for	 the	 the	 nature	 of	 democracy	 in	 the	 EU	 and	 its	 relationship	with	 transparency	 and	
openness	 in	the	context	of	 lawmaking.	The	current	balancing	act	 largely	 involves	the	 institutions	
themselves	keeping	control	of	secrecy	and	adopting	the	relevant	rules	as	a	matter	of	an	internal	










legislative	 act”	 (Article	 16(8)	 TEU	and	15(2)	 TFEU).	 The	 idea	 is	 that,	 at	 the	 very	 least,	 debate	 in	
Parliament	would	take	place	in	an	open	and	inclusive	manner	and	on	the	basis	of	published	drafts.	
The	Treaty	also	places	the	Council	and	the	European	Parliament	under	an	obligation	to	ensure	the	
publication	 of	 the	 documents	 relating	 to	 the	 legislative	 procedures	 subject	 to	 Regulation	 No	
















“enables	 citizens	 to	 participate	 more	 closely	 in	 the	 decision-making	 process	 and	
guarantees	 that	 the	 administration	 enjoys	 greater	 legitimacy	 and	 is	more	 effective	 and	
more	 accountable	 to	 the	 citizen	 in	 a	 democratic	 system[…].	 Openness	 in	 that	 respect	
contributes	 to	 strengthening	 democracy	 by	 allowing	 citizens	 to	 scrutinize	 all	 the	
information	which	has	formed	the	basis	of	a	legislative	act.	The	possibility	for	citizens	to	
find	 out	 the	 considerations	 underpinning	 legislative	 action	 is	 a	 precondition	 for	 the	
effective	exercise	of	their	democratic	rights”.21		
Regulation	1049/2001	has	not	been	updated	following	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	–	despite	many	years	
of	 trying.22	 The	 interinstitutional	 impasse	 on	 reform	has	 left	 the	 EU	 institutions	 a	 great	 deal	 of	
discretion	since	the	Regulation	does	not	give	detailed	guidance	on	how	the	balancing	between	the	
right	 of	 public	 access	 and	 the	 institutional	 need	 for	 secrecy	 ought	 to	 be	made.	 The	Article	 4(3)	
“space	to	think”	exception	provides	ample	ground	for	arguments	relating	to	the	need	to	protect	
institutional	 efficiency.23	 In	 particular,	 the	 Regulation	 does	 not	 identify	 the	 documents	 in	 the	
legislative	 procedure	 that	 should	 be	made	 available	without	 delay,	 or	 specify	 the	 effect	 of	 the	




democracy,	which	empowers	 the	citizens	 to	participate	 in	 the	democratic	 life	of	 the	Union,	and	
representative	 democracy.	 Representative	 democracy	builds	 on	 citizen	 representation	 in	 the	 EP	
and	 Member	 States	 representation	 in	 the	 Council	 through	 their	 governments.	 The	 national	
governments	are	democratically	accountable	to	their	own	parliaments	or	their	citizens.	While	our	
focus	is	more	on	direct	democracy,	legislative	transparency	is	vital	to	the	operation	of	both	forms	
of	 democracy.	 A	 particularly	 	 crucial	 element	 of	 democracy	 is	 public	 control.	 A	 legislative	
procedure	 which	 operates	 across	 multiple	 procedural	 stages	 allows	 the	 different	 players	 to	
“repeatedly	 question	 the	 arguments	 of	 the	 others,	 and	 mobilize	 public	 attention	 or	 affected	




occur	 through	 the	 use	 of	 a	 procedure	 that	 is	 public	 in	 nature	 and,	 in	 that	 sense,	
































the	 Council	 and	 the	 European	 Parliament	 co-legislating	 as	more	 or	 less	 equal	 partners	 in	 three	
readings	 and,	when	necessary,	 in	 the	Conciliation	Committee.	While	 the	procedure	was	 initially	
introduced	 to	 make	 EU	 law-making	 more	 democratic,	 many	 of	 the	 key	 decisions	 during	 this	
procedure	are	today	made	with	little	scope	for	public	oversight.	They	are	taken	in	a	“plethora	of	
informal	 and	 semi-formal	 meetings	 in	 which	 many	 of	 the	 real	 decisions	 about	 legislation	 are	
taken”.29	 In	 particular,	 the	 rise	 and	 rise	 of	 trialogues	 as	 the	 forum	 where	 legislative	 files	 are	
negotiated	and	decided	upon	between	 the	 three	 institutions	entails	 that	 interinstitutional	deals	
are,	as	the	main	rule,	made	in	in	a	fast-track	procedure	in	first	reading.30	During	this	phase,	the	EU	
democratic	 process	 is	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 very	 few:	 the	 European	 Parliament	 rapporteur(s),	 the	
representatives	of	the	Council	Presidency	and	Secretariat	and	a	few	Commission	officials,	or	more	
recently,	 by	 Commissioners.	 It	 is	 not	 just	 a	 matter	 of	 the	 “invisible	 transformation”31	 of	 the	
legislative	procedure	as	such	but	also	of	substantive	opacity.		
The	original	aim	of	 “informal	 trialogues”	was	 to	prepare	 for	Conciliation	Committee	meetings.32	
The	format	was	found	useful	in	many	ways.	A	Coreper	informal	exchange	of	views	in	1995	stressed	
the	 need	 to	 strengthen	 the	 trialogue,	 since	 the	 success	 of	 conciliation	 depended	 on	 the	
effectiveness	of	preparatory	work;	therefore	the	Ambassadors	wondered	about	the	possibility	to	
“envisage	a	simplified	procedure	under	which	an	agreement	between	the	two	 institutions	could	
























The	new	Treaty	also	 included	a	declaration	 (No.	34)	 in	which	the	 Intergovernmental	Conference	
called	 on	 the	 three	 institutions	 “to	make	 every	 effort	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 co-decision	 procedure	
operates	as	expeditiously	as	possible”.	Since	then,	trialogues	have	been	used	already	during	first	
reading,	with	 the	specific	aim	of	adopting	“fast	 track	 legislation”	 through	early	agreements.	The	
ability	to	produce	results	fast	has	remained	a	core	consideration.36	Literature	points	to	the	balance	






The	 wish	 to	 simplify	 procedures	 led	 to	 codecision	 being	 turned	 into	 the	 ordinary	 legislative	
procedure	 by	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Lisbon,	 and	 the	 use	 of	 special	 legislative	 procedures	 being	 limited.	
Today,	 the	 Treaties	 provide	 for	 85	 legal	 bases	 that	 refer	 to	 the	 use	 of	 this	 procedure	 in	 the	
adoption	of	EU	legislation.40	In	the	7th	parliamentary	term	(2009-2014),	89	percent	of	Commission	
proposals	 fell	 under	 legal	 bases	 that	were	 adopted	 in	 the	 ordinary	 legislative	 procedure.41	 This	
procedure	 is	 generally	 found	 to	 have	 succeeded	 beyond	 initial	 expectations,42	 been	 broadly	
accepted	 and	 provoked	 little	 public	 controversy.43	 Since	 its	 introduction,	 the	 procedure	 has	
“developed	 into	 a	well-oiled	 legislative	 procedure”	where	 informal	 trialogues	 act	 as	 “drivers	 of	
much	of	 the	 interinstitutional	 legislative	 activity”.44	Over	1,500	 trialogues	on	approximately	350	
codecision	files	were	held	under	the	7th	legislative	term.	They	are	an	incredibly	efficient	format	for	
accommodating	 institutional	positions,	and	assist	 in	closing	a	great	majority	of	deals	early	 in	the	




































“Each	 co-legislator	 will	 be	 more	 willing	 to	 negotiate	 in	 good	 faith	 with	 the	 other	 co-
legislator	 during	 the	 Trilogue	 if	 it	 believes	 that	 the	 agreement	 reached	 will	 then	 be	
formally	 adopted	 unchanged.	 Thus,	 changes	 to	 the	 text	 during	 the	 subsequent	 formal	
procedure	 (the	 vote	 in	 Parliament	 and	 the	 consideration	 by	 Council)	 are	 uncommon.	
What	happens	in	Trilogue	negotiations	is	therefore	key	for	the	eventual	content	of	much	
legislation.”52	
As	 a	 result,	 we	 witness	 an	 invisible	 transformation	 of	 the	 ordinary	 legislative	 procedure.	 The	
formal	 Treaty-based	 decision-making	 formats	 for	 interinstitutional	 decision	 making	 –	 to	 which	
transparency	 arrangements	 have	 more	 or	 less	 been	 linked	 –	 have	 been	 replaced	 by	 informal	
discussions.	While	 the	 formal	 structures	 of	 the	procedure	provide	 for	 democratic	 potential,	 the	
informal	 practices	 established	 by	 the	 co-legislatures	 render	 these	 qualities	 passive.53	 Early	
agreement	 in	 first	 reading	 is	 fundamentally	 different	 from	 procedures	 that	 go	 through	 two	 or	



























also	 had	 unexpected	 side-effects	 with	 negative	 consequences	 for	 the	 objectives	 that	 it	 was	
specifically	 aimed	 to	 address:	 transparency	 and	 accountability.55	 The	 assumption	 is	 often	 that	
efficiency	 gains	 (speed)	 outweigh	 these	 negative	 consequences	 but	 the	 relationship	 between	
transparency	and	efficiency	is	largely	untested	empirically.56		
The	Parliament’s	Rules	of	Procedure	are	the	only	institutional	rules	that	recognize	the	existence	of	
trialogues.57	 Their	 conduct	 relies	 on	 institutional	 practice,	 codified	 in	 a	 “Joint	 declaration	 on	
practical	arrangements	 for	 the	co-decision	procedure”	adopted	 in	2007,	preceding	the	Treaty	of	










Institutional	 attitudes	 and	 practices	 relating	 to	 transparency	 in	 trialogues	 have	 recently	 been	
mapped	in	the	context	of	an	own	initiative	Ombudsman	investigation	relating	to	the	matter.60	In	
their	 replies,	all	 three	 institutions	challenged	the	Ombudsman’s	mandate	 to	engage	 in	 the	own-






how	 to	 conduct	 trialogues	 meetings	 –	 and	 notably	 decisions	 on	 when	 to	 conduct	
trialogues,	 in	 which	 composition,	 on	 whether	 and	 how	 to	 issue	 support	 documents	 –	
pertain	to	the	political	responsibility	of	the	co-legislators	[….]”.62	
The	meetings	can	 take	 the	 form	of	 (informal)	 trialogues	or	 technical	meetings.	The	 latter	are	 to	


















the	 four-column	 document,	 which	 we	 will	 discuss	 later	 (Section	 3.3).	 The	 distinction	 between	
“technical”	and	“political”	is	however	difficult	to	maintain:					
“Sometimes	 you	 have	 political	 dialogues	which	 are	 so	 technical	 that	 you	wonder	what	
would	be	a	technical	trialogue.	But	you	also	have	very	political	trialogues,	where	it’s	really	
a	lot	of	politics:	more	political	messages	and	all	the	work	was	shifted	to	the	technical	level	
and	 the	 technical	 trialogues	 lasted	much	 longer	 than	 the	 political	 trialogues,	 and	 they	
would	 come	back	 and	 say	OK	 that’s	 fine	 go	 to	 the	next	 topic.	And	 I	 have	 to	 say	 this	 is	
where	the	deal	is	being	made.”63		
Most	matters	are	settled	in	technical	trialogues.	The	function	of	meetings	at	the	political	level	is	to	
confirm	 the	deal	 already	made	or	 agree	on	 the	proposals	 for	 solving	 the	questions	 that	 remain	
formally	open.	 Technical	 trialogues	 are	 to	 a	 large	extent	 about	brain-storming	and	 the	 informal	
exchange	of	ideas;	for	example,	EP	officials	are	not	expected	to	have	a	mandate	for	the	solutions	
they	propose.64		
“I’d	 like	 to	 think	 that	 there	 are	 some	 criteria	 to	 evaluate	what	 is	 technical	 and	what	 is	







institutions	 are	 in	 a	 more	 or	 less	 permanent	 dialogue	 at	 all	 levels,	 also	 outside	 the	 trialogue	
format,	making	 informal	contacts	“something	very	normal	and	natural”.67	Efficient	 law-making	 is	
stressed	 beyond	 those	 legislative	 files	 that	 have	 a	 clear	 dead	 line,	 such	 as	 need	 to	 replace	 a	
framework	that	is	about	to	expire	or	tackle	a	particularly	urgent	challenge:	
“It	 is	 clear	 that	 some	 legislative	 files	 have	 a	 fixed	 dead	 line	 or	 are	 linked	 to	 particular	
political	 pressure	 to	 close	 the	 file.	 But	 in	 many	 cases	 I	 have	 felt	 that	 it	 is	 good	 that	
somebody	draws	a	limit	to	negotiations	since	the	overall	solution	will	no	longer	improve	




One	 broader	 issue	 in	 this	 regard	 is	 how	 the	 Commission’s	 role	 is	 understood	 in	 the	 legislative	
















Commission’s	 right	of	 initiative,	 the	 legislative	 functions	are	allocated	to	 the	Parliament	and	the	
Council.	 Therefore,	 when	 preparing	 and	 developing	 a	 proposal	 for	 a	 legislative	 act,	 the	
Commission	is	not	acting	in	a	legislative	capacity.71	The	Commission	itself	defined	its	own	role	in	
the	context	of	recent	litigation	as	follows:	
“Although	 the	 final	 decision	 in	 the	 legislative	 procedure	 is	 taken	 by	 the	 European	
Parliament	and	the	Council,	 the	Commission	 is	 involved	 in	 it,	 from	the	beginning	to	the	




The	 Commission	 reply	 to	 the	 EO	 stresses	 that	 trialogue	 meetings	 are	 organized	 by	 the	 co-
legislators	(the	EP	and	Council):	“Commission	assists	the	Trilogue	negotiations,	by	explaining	and,	
if	 it	 feels	 the	need,	 defending	 the	merits	 of	 its	 proposal.	 The	Commission	may	 also	withdraw	a	
proposal	 in	 exceptional	 circumstances.”73	 The	 latter	 prerogative	 is	 strong,	 as	 the	Court	 recently	
confirmed	in	relation	to	a	legislative	file	where	the	Commission	withdrew	its	proposal	on	the	very	
day	 that	 the	 Parliament	 and	 the	 Council	 were	 preparing	 to	 formalise	 their	 agreement.74	 The	













ambition	 of	 the	 current	 Commission	 President	 is	 to	 lead	 what	 he	 calls	 a	 “highly	 political”	




















role	 as	 a	 mediator.	 Since	 EP	 and	 Council	 proposals	 would	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 higher	 standard	 of	
transparency,	it	would	be	odd	to	consider	the	role	of	the	Commission	as	that	of	an	administrator,	
to	 which	 a	 lower	 standard	 applies.79	 More	 generally	 we	 would	 stress	 that	 it	 is	 not	 easy	 to	
distinguish	the	purely	technical	from	the	political	–	either	as	a	matter	of	substance	or	over	time.80	
It	 is	 striking	 that	many	of	 the	 institutional	 solutions	 are	defended	on	 the	basis	 of	 the	 idea	 that	





The	 public	 access	 legal	 framework	 does	 not	 address	 the	 question	 of	 trialogue	 documents	
specifically.	 The	 2007	 joint	 declaration	 on	 practical	 arrangements	 quoted	 above	 stipulates	 that	
trialogues	 “shall	 be	 announced,	 where	 practicable”,	 and	 “when	 conclusion	 of	 a	 dossier	 at	 first	
reading	 is	 imminent,	 information	 on	 the	 intention	 to	 conclude	 an	 agreement	 should	 be	 made	




has	 its	 own	 systems	 for	 access,	 and	primarily	 settles	 questions	 relating	 to	 access	 to	 documents	
produced	by	itself	(when	necessary,	following	a	consultation,	if	the	request	concerns	a	document	
produced	 by	 another	 institution).	 For	 the	 Parliament’s	 part,	 documents	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	
Legislative	 Observatory,	 which	 is	 currently	 the	most	 comprehensive	 institutional	 register.83	 The	
Council	 also	 maintains	 a	 register,	 but	 finding	 documents	 in	 it	 requires	 knowledge	 of	 either	 its	
number,	 title	 or	 a	 time	 period	 for	 its	 creation.	 The	 Commission	 has	 no	 comprehensive	 public	
register.	 Its	register	contains	“a	number	of	documents,	with	a	focus	on	legislative	documents,	as	
well	 as	 agendas	 and	 minutes	 of	 Commission	 meetings”,	 and	 official	 Commission	 documents84	
(such	as	COM	or	SEC	documents	that	can	be	sought	by	number),	but	many	documents	it	has	in	its	






















the	 interinstitutional	 committee	 created	under	Regulation	1049/2001,86	 but	 so	 far	 produced	no	
concrete	 results.	 The	new	 IIA	 includes	a	 commitment	 to	 “improve	 communication	 to	 the	public	
during	 the	 whole	 legislative	 cycle”	 and	 “undertake	 to	 identify,	 by	 31	 December	 2016,	 ways	 of	
further	developing	platforms	and	tools	 to	 this	end,	with	a	view	to	establishing	a	dedicated	 joint	
database	on	 the	 state	of	play	of	 legislative	 files”.	 	Work	on	a	 joint	database	between	 the	 three	
institutions	 is	 ongoing,	 and	 there	 is	 an	 initiative	 to	 present	 all	 documents	 relating	 to	
interinstitutional	legislative	procedures	at	a	single	point	on	EUR-LEX.87	
There	 are	 no	 joint	 or	 agreed	minutes	 or	 reports	 of	 trialogue	meetings.	 Instead,	 reporting	 takes	
place	 within	 each	 institution	 according	 to	 its	 own	 practices.88	 As	 far	 as	 interinstitutional	




usually	 contains	 the	 initial	 Commission	 position,	 the	 Parliament’s	 position	 as	 adopted	 in	
Committee	and	the	Council	position.	 In	addition,	 the	document	 includes	a	 fourth	column,	which	
shows	 the	 compromises	 suggested	 by	 any	 of	 the	 three	 institutions	 or	 considered	 agreed	 to	
between	the	negotiators.91		
The	 practices	 relating	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 these	 documents	 are	 highly	 informal.	 The	 only	













comments	 and	 compromise	 solutions	 changes	 during	 the	 negotiations.94	 In	 the	 fourth	 column,	
“any	 institution	may	table	additional	written	contributions	on	specific	 issues	for	consideration	 in	

















political	 and	 negotiating	 circumstances.96	 Multi-column	 documents	 are	 atypical	 since	 they	 are	
living	 documents,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 specific	 point	 in	 time	 when	 they	 are	 formally	 completed	 or	
registered.	 Instead,	 amendments	 and	 compromise	 proposals	 are	 added	 to	 the	 same	Word	 file,	
which	 is	 subject	 to	 new	discussions	 in	 varying	 formats	 and	 frequently	 amended.97	 Four-column	
documents	are	not	documents	that	are	tabled	in	a	formal	setting,	“it	is	just	an	exchange”.98	They	







However,	 while	 done	 on	 the	 technical	 level,	 the	 process	 of	 drafting	 these	 documents	 is	 highly	
influential	 for	 the	outcome,	since	solutions	build	 largely	on	discussions	between	the	Presidency,	
the	Commission	and	the	Council	Secretariat	when	preparing	the	four-column-documents.100		
All	three	institutions	define	the	four-column	document	in	technical	terms.	For	the	Commission:	it	






In	 the	 Council,	 four-column	 documents	 are	 prepared	 as	 standard	 Council	 documents	 and	
registered	 in	 the	 public	 register	 when	 they	 are	 circulated	 to	 the	 Member	 States.	 Following	
distribution,	therefore,	their	existence	is	visible	in	the	register,	but	the	documents	cannot	usually	
be	downloaded.	Only	selected	versions	of	the	document	are	distributed	to	the	Member	States	and	






















negotiating	 process	 always	 becomes	 a	 public	 document”.106	Disclosure	of	 documents	 related	 to	
conciliation	 and	 third	 reading,	 in	 the	 rare	 cases	when	 these	 stages	 are	 used,	 are	 systematically	




information	 provided	 by	 their	 national	 governments,	who	might	 be	 constitutionally	 required	 to	
provide	 such	 information	 but	 themselves	 have	 difficulty	 in	 gaining	 access	 to	 information.	 This	
makes	 it	virtually	 impossible	 for	 them	to	 	engage	 in	a	dialogue	with	 their	own	parliament	while	
trialogue	negotiations	are	ongoing.	The	positions	of	national	parliaments	are	usually	based	on	the	
initial	 Commission	 proposal,	 which	 is	 often	 significantly	 altered	 during	 the	 legislative	 process,	
which	moves	 fast,	 something	 that	hinders	 effective	 scrutiny.107	While	Member	 States	may	have	
other	 general	 channels	 of	 information	 concerning	 trialogues,	 for	 example	 by	 interaction	 with	
MEPs	 of	 their	 own	 nationals108	 their	 knowledge	 of	 actual	 amendments	made	 during	 trialogues	
may	 be	 limited.	 A	 topical	 example	 of	 a	 trialogue	 deal	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 Regulation	 (EU)	 No	
909/2014,	 which	 exceptionally	 includes	 a	 national	 derogation	 applicable	 to	 Finland.109	 What	
makes	the	file	interesting	is	that	neither	the	Finnish		Government	nor	the	Parliament	ever	asked	
for	 the	derogation,	nor	was	 it	 included	 in	 the	Council	mandate.	There	are	no	public	documents	
from	 the	 trialogue	 stage	 to	 verify	 its	 origin,	 but	 most	 likely	 the	 derogation	 originated	 in	 the	
financial	lobby,	and	was	inserted	by	a	trialogue	representative	of	the	EP.110	This	is	an	example	of	
highly	 selective	 transparency-	 to	 the	 lobbyists	but	not	 the	affected	national	public	 interest.	 The	
unclearly	 drafted	 derogation	 in	 the	 Finnish	 case	 caused	 significant	 delay	 in	 national	
implementation,	not	least	because	there	was	no	national	position	clarifying	the	objectives	of	this	
derogation.	A	legal	advisor	working	for	another	national	parliament	explains	trialogues	is	:	
“a	 sore	 point	 for	 us,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	 so	 lacking	 in	 transparency,	 so	 it’s	 very	
difficult	 to	 know	what’s	going	on,	and	 from	a	 scrutiny	point	of	 view	we	only	 really	
manage	 to,	 on	many	 occasions,	 get	 engaged	when	 the	whole	 thing’s	 all	 done	 and	
dusted	 and	 it’s	 all	 too	 late.[…]	what	we	 end	 up	with	 in	 the	worst	 cases,	 or	 at	 the	





In	 the	 following	 section,	we	address	 three	 issues	 that	have	been	particularly	 contentious	 in	 this	

















The	 provisions	 on	 open	 Council	 deliberations	 found	 in	 the	 Treaty	 are	 significant	 as	 a	matter	 of	
principle,	but	in	practice	often	irrelevant	for	legislative	matters	that	are	closed	in	first	reading.	In	
the	 large	 majority	 of	 files,	 legislative	 work	 is	 undertaken	 by	 Council	 preparatory	 bodies	
(committees	and	working	parties)	convening	under	Coreper,	which	leads	the	work	and	closes	most	
of	the	deals112	before	they	reach	a	formal	Council	configuration	at	ministerial	 level.	Coreper	and	
working	 party	 discussions	 are	 not	 open	 to	 the	 public.	 Coreper	 documents,	 such	 as	 Council	
mandates	 for	 the	 trialogues,	 are	not	made	public	on	distribution.	When	 they	are	made	publicly	
available	 depends	 on	 the	 file.113	 Legislative	 documents	 are	 usually	 prepared	 as	 ST	 documents	
(standard)	and	marked	 in	 the	Council	 register	when	circulated	 to	delegations.114	Since	2016	 this	
has	increasingly	also	applied	to	room	documents	and	working	papers:	the	Council’s	new	system	of	
recording	documents	also	covers	 ‘informal	documents’,	which	are	now	registred	and	thus	easily	
retrievable.115	However,	 the	 great	majority	of	 them	are	made	public	 only	upon	 request,	 after	 a	
case-by-case	 assessment,	 while	 the	 discussions	 on	 the	 legislative	 file	 are	 on-going.	 In	 this	




a	 file	has	been	closed,	 in	practice	after	a	delay	of	a	year	or	 two.117	However,	even	at	 the	 stage	
when	 documents	 are	 generally	 released	 there	 are	 certain	 documents	 that	 merit	 particular	































In	 the	 trialogues,	 the	 Council	 is	 represented	 by	 its	 Presidency,	 assisted	 by	 staff	 from	 the	
Secretariat	 and	 the	 Council	 Legal	 Service.	 In	 principle,	 feedback	 from	 trialogues	 is	 given	 to	 the	
delegations	either	through	working	parties	or	Coreper:	
“Trialogues	are	usually	 reported	 from	 in	detail	 in	working	parties	 and	 for	Coreper	on	a	






currently	 it	 is	 Coreper.	 And	 in	 Coreper	 I	we	 seldom	 take	matters	 to	 the	ministers	 that	
would	 include	 open	 questions.	 This	 is	 necessary	 because	 of	 the	 technical	 nature	 of	
questions	but	also	for	reasons	of	scheduling,	since	many	of	our	Councils	only	convene	less	
seldom	 than	 once	 a	 month.	 There	 is	 the	 question	 of	 efficiency,	 but	 also	 political	
credibility.	And	this	smoke	screen	is	needed	at	some	stage	where	you	can	move	without	






In	 this	 setting,	 the	 objective	 of	 ensuring	 transparency	 in	 EU	 policymaking,	 characterized	 by	 the	
ideal	of	consensus	among	sovereign	States	as	main	stakeholders,	is	genuinely	challenging.122	
Fears	 of	 slowing	 down	 the	 process	 have	 largely	 guided	 Council	 policy,	 in	 particular	 when	 its	
decision-making	 is	 in	 its	 early	 stages.	 As	 far	 as	 Member	 State	 positions	 are	 concerned,	 the	




how	 the	 requested	 contributions	 related	 to	 “particularly	 sensitive	 issues	 in	 the	 context	 of	
preliminary	 discussions	 within	 the	 Council	 […]	 where	 thorough	 discussions	 have	 not	 yet	 taken	
place	 […]	 and	 a	 clear	 approach	 has	 not	 yet	 emerged	 […]”.124	 The	 Council	 has	 maintained	 that	
democratic	debate	does	not	presume	identifying	delegations.	 Its	“legislative	process	 is	very	fluid	
and	 requires	 a	 high	 level	 of	 flexibility”,	 enabling	Member	 States	 to	 modify	 their	 positions	 and	















writing,	 which	 would	 “cause	 significant	 damage	 to	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 Council’s	 internal	
decision-making	 process	 by	 impeding	 complex	 internal	 discussions	 on	 the	 proposed	 act,	 and	
would	 also	 be	 seriously	 prejudicial	 to	 the	 overall	 transparency	 of	 the	 Council’s	 decision-
making”.126	 The	 secrecy	 surrounding	 Council	 decision-making	 also	 has	 interinstitutional	
implications	 for	 the	 Parliament,	 which	 enjoys	 limited	 access	 to	 information	 about	 discussions	
within	 the	 Council	 and	 individual	 Member	 States’	 positions.	 Its	 lack	 of	 access	 to	 information	
concerning	Council	negotiations	is	a	frequently	voiced	concern.127		
The	question	relating	to	publicity	of	Member	State	positions	was	raised	when	Access	Info	Europe,	
an	 NGO	 promoting	 freedom	 of	 information	 in	 the	 EU,	 requested	 access	 to	 a	 working	 party	
document	 relating	 to	 a	 legislative	 matter,	 which	 included	 footnotes	 indicating	 the	 positions	 of	
individual	delegations.	Negotiations	on	the	file	were	on-going	at	the	time	of	the	request,	and	no	
common	 position	 by	 the	 Council	 had	 yet	 been	 adopted.	 The	 central	 question	was	whether	 the	












the	 Court,	 also	 keeping	 in	 mind	 that	 the	 requested	 documents	 related	 to	 the	 early	 stages	 of	
Council	decision-making.	In	particular,	according	to	the	Court,	
“the	 various	 proposals	 for	 amendment	 or	 re-drafting	made	 by	 the	 four	Member	 State	
delegations	 which	 are	 described	 in	 the	 requested	 document	 are	 part	 of	 the	 normal	
legislative	 process,	 from	 which	 it	 follows	 that	 the	 requested	 documents	 could	 not	 be	





Council	 to	 draw	up	documents	which	 identify	Member	 States’	 positions,	 but	 such	documents	 –	
when	drafted	systematically	 in	all	 legislative	files	–	assist	 in	providing	a	detailed	overview	of	the	
state	of	play	of	on-going	negotiations.	However,	 situations	exist	where	 the	automatic	 recording	











inappropriate.	 Alternatively,	 the	 practice	 of	 recording	 individual	 delegations	 in	 all	 documents	
relating	 to	 on-going	 legislative	 procedures	 could	 be	 ceased.	 This	 would	 address	 the	 specific	
concern	 that	 publicity	 could	 reduce	Member	 States'	 negotiating	 flexibility,	 but	 also	 render	 the	
preparatory	 documents	 less	 useful	 for	 delegations.	 Coreper	 opted	 for	 a	 middle	 position:	 to	
continue	 recording	 Member	 State	 symbols	 in	 documents	 relating	 to	 on-going	 legislative	




to	 enforce	 the	 ruling.	 A	 legal	 advisor	working	 for	 a	 national	 parliament	 sees	 this	 reluctance	 as	
hindering	national	scrutiny	as	well:	
“I	don’t	think	the	Council	has	been	really	following	the	spirit	of	the	jurisprudence	anyway	
on	 the	 disclosure	 of	 legislative	 documents.	 I	 mean	 they	 still	 whack	 a	 limité	 stamp	 on	
things	 that	 have	 Member	 State	 positions	 when	 it’s	 by	 no	 means	 accepted	 by	 the	
Court.”133	
The	 European	 Ombudsman	 recently	 launched	 a	 strategic	 inquiry	 relating	 to	 the	 disclosure	 of	
documents	on	discussions	on	draft	EU	legislative	acts	in	Council	preparatory	bodies	in	order	to	to	
examine	 how	 the	Access	 Info	 ruling	 is	 implemented	 in	 practice	 and	 to	 scrutinise	 the	 extent	 to	
which	 the	 present	 arrangements	 adequately	 facilitate	 public	 scrutiny	 of	 ongoing	 legislative	
discussions.134	The	Council	now	feels	that	the	ruling	does	not	require	the	adaptation	of	its	Rules	of	
Procedure,135	 and	 that	 Regulation	 1049/2001	 is	 applied	 so	 that	 access	 to	 delegation	 symbols	 is	
given	 in	 ongoing	 legislative	 procedures	 ‘save	 in	 duly	 justified	 and	 exceptional	 cases’.136	 The	
Council’s	 latest	 Annual	 Report	 on	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Regulation	 indicates	 that	 at	 the	 initial	
stage,	 the	need	 to	protect	 the	Council’s	 internal	decision-making	was	 the	most	used	exception	 (555	
times,	 or	 in	 36%	 of	 applications).	 This	 was	 also	 the	 most	 used	 exception	 invoked	 to	 justify	 partial	
access	(23	times,	or	42%)	at	the	stage	of	confirmatory	applications	(90	times,	or	87%).137		
These	 discussions	 raise	 a	 key	 issue	 relating	 to	 legislative	 transparency:	 what	 is	 an	 acceptable	
efficiency	 cost	 in	 a	 law-making	 procedure	 that	 claims	 democratic	 foundations?	 The	 underlying	
assumption	seems	to	be	that	an	increase	in	transparency	(potentially)	exposes	the	debates	of	law-
makers	to	a	general	public	composed	of	outsiders,	and	that	this	may	 lead	to	a	 loss	of	decisional	
efficiency	 measured	 either	 in	 time	 or	 the	 attainment	 of	 particular	 pre-set	 policy	 goals	 by	 the	
insiders.	138	By	inverse	logic,	it	is	believed	that	a	decrease	in	transparency	leads	to	gains	in	terms	of	























legal	 advice,	which	 requires	 the	 institution	 to	balance	 the	harm	 from	disclosure	with	 the	public	
interest	 in	 disclosure.	 The	 applicability	 of	 the	 exception	 to	 legal	 service	 opinions	 given	 in	 the	
context	of	 legislative	procedures	has	been	 repeatedly	 subject	 to	disagreement.	 For	 the	Council,	
their	disclosure	should	be	limited,	since	these	opinions	are		
“an	important	instrument	which	enables	the	Council	to	be	sure	of	the	compatibility	of	its	
acts	 with	 Community	 law	 and	 to	 move	 forward	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 legal	 aspects	 at	






documents	containing	the	 legal	service’s	advice	on	 legal	questions	arising	 in	 the	debate	
on	 legislative	 initiatives	would	be	 in	 the	general	 interest	of	 increasing	transparency	and	
openness	of	the	institution’s	decision-making	process.”141	
Like	the	Council,	the	Commission	has	been	defensive	of	legal	advice.	In	its	view,		
“Only	 clear	 and	 independent	 legal	 advice	 can	 play	 an	 effective	 role	 in	 influencing	 their	





legal	 advice,	 drawn	 up	 in	 cautious	 terms,	 cannot	 be	 as	 influential	 or	 effective	 in	 guiding	 the	
institution	to	a	legally	sound	result	and	hence	contribute	to	legal	certainty	and	the	rule	of	law”.143		





the	 legislators.	 In	such	circumstances	[...]	 the	drafting	of	a	specific	provision	requires,	
almost	by	definition,	written	action,	in	the	form	of	a	first	draft	and	then	amendments	











The	Commission	assessed	the	matter	 in	particular	 from	the	perspective	of	prospective	 litigation.	
Disclosure	of	documents	that	are	of	relevance	for	future	litigation	would	“place	the	debate	in	the	
public	square,	while	at	the	same	time	being	discussed	before	the	courts”,	which	would	“seriously	
also	 undermine	 the	 serenity	 and	 integrity	 of	 the	 legal	 debates	 before	 the	 Union	 courts”.145	
Consequently,		
“on	balance,	the	value-added	of	the	disclosure	of	those	documents	for	the	democratic	life	
of	 the	 Union	 is	 negligible	 or	 even	 negative,	 and	 that	 the	 need	 to	 protect	 ‘court	
proceedings	and	legal	advice’	weighs	much	more.”146		
The	Commission	has	also	stressed	how	the	documents	drafted	by	its	legal	services	in	the	trialogue	
context	 do	 not	 reflect	 the	 positions	 defended	 by	 the	 Commission	 in	 the	 legislative	 process	 but	
instead	concern	“legal	advice	 in	 the	preparation	of	positions	 to	be	taken.	There	 is	no	overriding	







political	 body,	 and	 it	 legal	 service,	which	 gives	much	 of	 its	 advice	 to	 and	 in	 committees	whose	
work	 is	 public	 in	 any	 case,	 so	 there	 is	 no	 presumption	 that	 its	 advice	 should	 or	 could	 be	
confidential:		
“I	have	no	particular	problems	about	giving	legal	advice	to	the	public,	as	I	say,	it	has	a	very	




protection	 of	 legal	 advice	 in	 the	 legislative	 context.	 The	 Court	 established	 that	 “Regulation	 No	
1049/2001	 imposes,	 in	 principle,	 an	 obligation	 to	 disclose	 the	 opinions	 of	 the	 Council’s	 legal	
service	 relating	 to	 a	 legislative	 process”.150	 However,	 access	 can	 be	 denied	 temporarily	 and	 in	


















Regulation	 1049/2001	 presumes	 that	 the	 decision-making	 process	 is	 seriously	 undermined	
through	disclosure	having	 a	 substantial	 impact.	While	 the	 legislative	procedure	was	on-going	 at	
the	 time	 of	Miettinen’s	 request,	 the	 contested	 decision	 failed	 to	 contain	 any	 tangible	 element	
demonstrating	a	risk	that	would	be	reasonably	foreseeable	and	not	purely	hypothetical.	Contrary	
to	the	Council’s	arguments,	the	Court	stressed	that		
“full	 public	 access	 to	 the	 contents	 of	 Council	 documents	 constitutes	 the	 principle,	
above	all	 in	 the	context	of	a	procedure	 in	which	 the	 institutions	act	 in	a	 legislative	
capacity,	and	that	the	exceptions	must	be	interpreted	strictly.	First,	[…]	it	should	be	
noted	that	the	requested	document	examines	whether	the	proposed	legal	basis	for	
the	 proposal	 for	 a	 directive	 is	 appropriate.	 It	 is	 sufficient	 to	 note	 […]	 that	 the	
question	of	the	legal	basis	is	an	essential	question	in	the	legislative	process	and	does	
not	shift	the	focus	of	debates,	but	 is	an	essential	part	thereof.	Secondly,	as	regards	
the	 risk	 invoked	 by	 the	 Council	 that	 disclosure	 of	 the	 requested	 document	 would	
impede	its	negotiating	capacities	and	the	chances	of	reaching	an	agreement	with	the	
Parliament,	 […]a	 proposal	 is	 designed	 to	 be	 debated,	 in	 particular	 as	 regards	 the	
choice	of	legal	basis.	Moreover,	as	the	applicant	states,	in	the	light	of	the	importance	
of	 the	choice	of	 legal	basis	of	a	 legislative	act,	 the	transparency	of	 the	choice	does	
not	weaken	the	decision-making	process,	but	strengthens	it.”153		
The	scope	of	the	legal	advice	exception	in	the	legislative	context	has	recently	been	examined	in	a	
number	 of	 cases	 relating	 to	 the	 negotiations	 of	 the	 new	directive	 concerning	 the	manufacture,	
presentation	 and	 sale	 of	 tobacco	 (TPD)	 and	 related	 products.154	 In	 these	 cases	 a	 number	 of	
affected	tobacco	companies	who	were	challenging	 the	validity	of	 the	new	 legislation	 in	national	
courts	 had	 applied	 for	 access	 to	 documents	 relating	 to	 the	 trialogue	 phase.	 The	 requested	
documents	 included	 a	 number	 of	 e-mail	messages	 sent	 between	 the	 different	 legal	 advisers	 of	
institutions	 and	 Member	 States.	 The	 Council	 refused	 to	 grant	 access	 to	 these	 documents,	
emphasizing	 that	 the	 messages	 contained	 “informal	 exchanges	 regarding	 the	 preliminary	 legal	
positions”	 on	 particularly	 controversial,	 complex	 and	 debated	 provision,	 arguing	 that	 informal	
documents	 of	 this	 kind	 “should	 enjoy	 specific	 protection,	 precisely	 because	 they	were	 informal	
and	 intermediate”.155	 The	 Commission	 refusal	 was	 primarily	 based	 on	 the	 connection	 of	 these	
documents	 with	 pending	 litigation,	 some	 of	 which	 involved	 the	 applicants,	 whose	 interest	 in	
gaining	access	was	thus	more	private	and	privileged	than	public.156	The	Court	accepted	that		
“Although	the	 legislative	discussions	conducted	during	a	 trilogue	often	concern	political	
issues,	 they	 may	 also	 sometimes	 concern	 technical	 legal	 issues.	 In	 the	 latter	 case,	 on	
occasion,	the	legal	services	of	the	three	institutions	must	discuss	and	agree	on	a	position,	


















the	 chosen	 legal	 basis	 was	 already	 subject	 to	 legal	 challenge.159	 The	 applicants	 had	 a	 private	





seriously	 compromised	 if	 it	 needed	 to	 consider	 internal	 positions	 concerning	 the	 legality	 of	 the	
various	 options	 envisaged	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 drawing	 up	 of	 the	 act	 in	 question,	 including	
assessments	by	 its	own	staff	which	may	have	ultimately	been	disregarded.161	Disclosure	of	 such	
documents	would		
“seriously	 compromise	 its	decision-making	process,	as	 it	would	deter	 staff	 from	making	
such	remarks	independently	and	without	being	unduly	influenced	by	the	prospect	of	wide	
disclosure	 exposing	 the	 institution	 of	which	 they	 are	 part.	 The	 possibility	 of	 expressing	
views	independently	within	an	institution	helps	to	encourage	internal	discussions	with	a	
view	 to	 improving	 the	 functioning	 of	 that	 institution	 and	 contributing	 to	 the	 smooth	
running	of	the	decision-making	process.”162		
It	 would	 seem	 that	 these	 rulings,	 from	 the	 General	 Court,	 	 expand	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 relevant	
exception	as	compared	to	previous	case	law.	In	Turco,	the	CJEU	was	not	convinced	by	arguments	
relating	 to	 external	 pressure.163	 The	 institutional	 thinking	 in	 the	 legal	 services	 points	 to	 an	
understanding	 ranging	 from	 categorical	 protection	 of	 their	 advice	 to	 a	 need	 to	 protect	 advice	
beyond	the	closure	of	the	relevant	legislative	procedure	every	time	institutions	act	contrary	to	the	
advice	of	their	legal	services.164		
Due	 to	 the	 predominant	 institutional	 mindset,	 the	 Turco	 ruling	 never	 had	 any	 more	 than	 a	
marginal	 effect	 on	 institutional	 behavior.165	 Indeed,	 a	 pertinent	 example	 of	 this	 is	 the	 Council	
Rules	of	Procedure,	which	were	never	updated	 to	 reflect	 the	 jurisprudence.	Several	appeals	are	
also	pending	before	the	European	Ombudsman.	The	fact	that	very	few	legal	service	opinions	are	
actively	 made	 public	 is	 a	 point	 observed	 also	 at	 national	 level	 when	 the	 justification	 for	
amendments	 made	 during	 Council	 discussions	 have	 remained	 difficult	 to	 trace	 in	 public	




















the	 law,	often	with	 reference	to	case	 law	or	EU	 legislation,	 rather	 than	concrete	suggestions	on	
thw	 choices	 to	 be	 made	 or	 what	 should	 be	 done.	 Recent	 rulings	 demonstrate	 that	 there	 are	
however	 instances	 where	 legal	 advisers	 in	 the	 trialogue	 context	 not	 only	 give	 advice	 on	 legal	
matters.	Rather	they	can	and	also	do	act	as	mandated	with	the	task	of	reaching	an	agreement.167	
This	may	 lead	 to	 the	drafting	 of	 compromise	 texts.	 	 The	 legal	 advice	 then	becomes	part	 of	 the	





pending	 before	 the	 General	 Court.168	 Their	 publicity	 	 has	 so	 far	 only	 been	 addressed	 by	 the	
European	Ombudsman	 in	 the	context	of	her	 recent	 investigation.	The	Ombudsman	recognizes	a	
general	 difficulty	 with	 tracing	 and	 locating	 existing	 public	 information	 relating	 to	 legislative	
procedures	and	recommends	the	establishment	of	a	joint	database.	She	urges	the	institutions	to	
provide	 information	on	 trialogue	dates	 and	 the	 institutions’	 initial	 positions	 on	 the	Commission	
proposal,	 regardless	 of	 the	 level	 at	 which	 the	 position	 has	 been	 adopted	 internally.	 As	 noted	
above,	this	is	a	highly	relevant	recommendation	for	the	Council	in	particular.	The	Ombudsman	also	
asks	 for	general	summary	agendas	before	or	shortly	after	 the	trialogue	meetings	but	 is	satisfied	
with	 information	 that	 does	 not	 reveal	 individual	 strategies	 or	 compromise	 negotiations.	 She	
acknowledges	that	access	to	the	evolving	versions	of	the	four-column	document	would	allow	the	
public	 to	 follow	how	a	 final	 text	has	emerged	 from	 the	 institutions’	 different	 starting	positions.	
However,	 the	 EO	 proves	 sensitive	 to	 institutional	 concerns	 relating	 to	 efficiency:	 “It	 is	 arguable	
that	 the	 interest	 in	well-functioning	 trilogue	 negotiations	 temporarily	 outweighs	 the	 interest	 in	
transparency	 for	 as	 long	 as	 the	 trilogue	 negotiations	 are	 ongoing.”	 Four-column	 documents	
should,	 however,	 proactively	 be	made	available	 as	 soon	as	possible	 after	 the	negotiations	have	
been	concluded.	In	addition,	she	argues	for	making	lists	of	trialogue	documents,	including	a	list	of	
the	 politically	 responsible	 representatives	 present.	 In	 case	 negotiations	 are	 delegated	 to	 civil	
servants,	their	names	should	be	accessible.		
The	 Ombudsman	 recommendations	 appear	 very	 restrained	 considering	 that	 her	 approach	
ressembles	 that	 already	 enunciated	 by	 the	 Council	 itself	 in	 a	 report	 adopted	 in	 2000.	 In	 that	
report,	 legislative	 transparency	 is	 mainly	 treated	 as	 a	 matter	 falling	 under	 a	 common	
communications	strategy:	
“A	 paradoxical	 situation	 exists.	 The	 co-decision	 innovation	 has	 become	 a	 point	 of	
reference	 among	 legislative	 procedures,	 but	 is	 still	 little	 known.	 Its	 results,	 even	when	
they	 relate	 to	 areas	 of	 direct	 concern	 to	 Europe's	 citizens,	 are	 given	 only	 very	 little	
publicity.	Efforts	must	be	made	to	 rectify	 this	situation	by	setting	up	a	communications	











co-decision	dossiers,	 informing	of	 the	 results	of	negotiations	within	 the	Conciliation	Committee,	
and	 informing	 the	 press	 about	 the	 progress	 of	 legislative	 co-decision	 procedures.	 Apart	 from	
requiring	the	establishment	of	a	joint	database,	the	Ombudsman	report	adds	little	to	the	position	
adopted	 by	 the	 Council	 itself	 almost	 20	 years	 ago,	 long	 before	 the	 new	 Treaty	 framework	 into	
force.	
One	of	 the	predominant	 reasons	 for	 institutions	 to	prefer	a	 logic	of	 transparency	 that	privileges	
communication	is	the	ability	for	the	(executive)	institution	to		enjoy	almost	unlimited	discretion	to	
autonomously	 decide	 what,	 and	 what	 not,	 to	 intentionally	 reveal	 and	 with	 what	 slant	 to	
communicate	it.	It	also	allows	the	institutional	actor	to	assess	the	necessity	for	communication	in	
view	of	the	overall	needs	of	efficiency	and	the	ability	to	reach	decisions.	It	is	the	classic	argument	
of	 negotiations	 of	 any	 kind	 –	 that	 only	 decisions	 behind	 closed	 doors	 will	 enable	 actual	
compromises	 to	 be	 reached.	 While	 “[c]losed	 settings	 could	 be	 legitimate	 in	 situations	 where	
actors	search	for	common	ground	and	where	a	shielded	setting	is	a	means	to	reaching	goals	that	
can	otherwise	not	be	achieved	[…]	when	the	purpose	of	a	setting	is	the	adoption	of	public	policy,	
secretly	 reached	agreements	must	at	 some	point	be	 tested	and	 justified	 in	a	publicly	accessible	
manner.”170	 If	 that	 is	applied	more	concretely	to	the	 legislative	setting	then	 in	order	to	produce	
good	 legislation,	 	 “legislators	have	 to	be	able	 to	use	 their	discretion	and	 judgment	 to	negotiate	




particular	 in	 the	Access	 Info	 ruling	 quoted	 above,	where	 the	 Court	 required	 a	 high	 standard	 of	
proof	 to	 establish	 a	 genuine	 risk	 of	 serious	 harm.	 The	 presumption	 of	 openness	 requires,	 that	
documents	are	made	available,	unless	this	criterion	is	fulfilled,	based	on	individual	examination	of	
documents.	We	see	no	reason	why	these	general	principles	would	not	apply	also	to	four-column	
documents.	 What	 the	 European	 Ombudsman	 seems	 to	 suggest	 is	 a	 general	 presumption	 of	
secrecy	 in	 the	 legislative	 context,	which	would	 free	 the	 institutions	 from	 the	duty	of	 examining	





as	a	matter	of	principle,	be	held	not	 to	apply	 if	 the	applicant	manages	 to	demonstrate	 that	 the	
presumption	does	not	apply	or	that	there	exists	a	“higher	public	interest”	justifying	disclosure.174	














rather	 abstract	 and	 with	 no	 access	 to	 the	 actual	 document	 it	 may	 be	 very	 difficult,	 if	 not	
impossible,	to	refute	the	presumption.	This	may	require	some	rethinking	of	general	presumptions	
of	non-disclosure.		
The	 Ombudsman’s	 conclusion	 also	 contradicts	 an	 emerging	 feature	 in	 Court	 jurisprudence	 on	
legislative	 transparency	which	 suggests	 that	 closed	 stages	 in	 decision-making	 can	 be	 justified	 if	
they	 are	 followed	by	 open	ones	where	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 influence	 the	 outcome.	 For	 example,	 in	
ClientEarth	 the	 General	 Court	 accepted	 that	 the	 citizens’	 right	 to	 know	 the	 underpinnings	 of	
legislative	action	in	real-time	is	less	relevant	at	the	preparatory	stage	of	a	legislative	proposal	than	
later	 on.	 This	 is	 because	 there	will	 be	 a	 chance	 to	 influence	 the	 procedure	 after	 the	 legislative	
procedure	has	been	initiated.176	This	logic	is	familiar	from	the	Court’s	earlier	case	law	relating	to	
transparency	at	 the	stage	of	Conciliation	Committee.	 In	 the	 IATA	 case,	 the	claimants	contended	
that	 the	 principles	 of	 representative	 democracy	 were	 undermined	 since	 the	 meetings	 of	 the	
Conciliation	 Committee	 were	 not	 public	 in	 nature.	 The	 Court	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 joint	 text	
adopted	by	the	Conciliation	Committee	must	still	be	examined	by	the	Parliament	itself	with	a	view	
to	 its	 approval;	 an	 examination	 that	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 conditions	 of	 transparency	 under	 the	
Parliament’s	 normal	 transparency	 provisions,	 thus	 ensuring	 “in	 any	 event	 the	 genuine	
participation	 of	 the	 Parliament	 in	 the	 legislative	 process	 in	 compliance	 with	 the	 principles	 of	





of	 the	 Regulation	 in	 guaranteeing	 the	 “widest	 possible	 openness”	 that	 is	 based	 on	 the	
consideration	 of	 concrete	 harm	 in	 individual	 cases.	 Limiting	 access	 during	 the	 entire	 stage	 of	




modifications	 proposed	 by	 lawyer-linguists.	 If	 these	 documents	 remain	 confidential,	 there	 are	
limited	ways	 in	which	 civil	 society	 or	 citizens	 to	 engage	 in	 a	 timely	 and	 informed	debate	 about	
matters	that	are	on	the	legislative	agenda,	beyond	the	use	of	communication	policy	tools,	which	
we	find	unsatisfactory	as	an	avenue	for	ensuring	public	access	as	a	part	of	ensuring	accountability.	























democratic	 procedure.	 Nor	 is	 it	 appropriate	 for	 European	 civil	 servants	 who	 apply	 the	 public	
access	rules	within	the	institutions	to	use	their	intrinsic	discretion	so	as	to	‘protect’	the	legislative	
agenda	and	pre-legislative	policy	choices	within	the	Commission	or	another	institution.	This	is	all	
the	more	 so	when	one	 takes	 into	account	 the	 selective	 transparency	 through	access	 that	many	
lobbyists	enjoy	in	practice	within	the	legislative	process.178	The	reality	of	selective	transparency	for	
the	privileged	few	brings	with	 it	the	need	to	balance	in	the	broader	public	 interest	and	ensuring	




Regulation	 1049/2001	 is	 chronically	 and	 structurally	 outdated.	 It	 is	 not	 just	 a	matter	 of	muscle	
fatigue	 but	 also	 of	 an	 altered	 institutional	 environment.	 The	 clear	 and	 stated	 ambition	 of	 the	
Lisbon	Treaty	 is	to	ensure	 legislative	transparency.	The	outdated	Regulation	 leaves	far	too	much	
scope	 for	 institutional	 discretion.	 Amending	 the	 Regulation	 in	 line	 with	 Lisbon	 Treaty	 is	 and	
remains	desirable	for	many	reasons.	But	–quite	aside	from	the	seeming	political	deadlock	on	this	
and	the	risk	of	retrogression	-	the	crucial	issue	is	how	the	legislative	procedure	itself	is	regulated	












stage	 of	 insterinstitutional	 negotiations,	 in	 particular	 trialogues.	 This	 is	 the	 arena	 where	
compromises	are	being	made	on	the	 legislative	package	as	a	whole,	resulting	 in	the	final	text	of	
the	 act	 being	 approved	 unamended	 in	 formal	 procedures.	 In	 this	 arena,	 the	 Ombudsman’s	














Consequently,	 we	 do	 not	 agree	 with	 the	 Ombudsman	 on	 four-column	 documents,	 which	 runs	
contrary	 to	 the	 democratic	 underpinnings	 of	 the	 Regulation	 and	 some	 of	 the	 Court’s	 most	
established	 case	 law.	 In	 our	 view	 four-column	documents	 should,	 as	 the	 general	 rule,	 be	made	
available	 proactively	 and	 in	 real	 time,	 following	 the	 presumption	 of	 openness	 built	 into	 the	
Treaties	and	the	Regulation.	At	the	very	least	and	as	an	interim	arrangement	–not	quite	dawn	but	
only	 the	 first	 hints	 of	 it-	 four-column	 documents	 should	 be	 made	 publicly	 available	 when	 the	
public	access	provisions	are	activated	(passive	access	to	documents).	Disclosure	should	be,	as	with	
any	 disclosure	 under	 the	 Regulation	 and	 in	 line	 with	 existing	 case	 law,	 subject	 to	 concrete	
evaluation	 of	 harm	 in	 individual	 cases.	When	 	 possible	 harm	 to	 the	 interests	 protected	 by	 the	





nature,	 as	 the	 institutional	 thinking	 quoted	 above	 demonstrates.	 The	 evaluation	 of	 harm	must	
primordially	reflect	the	democratic	underpinnings	of	the	Regulation.	 It	should	not	be	used	as	an	
excuse	to	avoid	political	responsibility	before	citizens	or	national	parliaments	for	choices	made.	It	
is	 hard	 to	 see	why	 the	general	 public	 interest	 in	 the	adoption	of	 EU	wide	 legislation	would	not	
outweigh	 the	 institutions	 own	 interests	 in	 completing	 a	 law-making	 procedure	 as	 quickly	 as	
possible.	This	is	not	to	say	that	we	see	no	room	whatsoever	for	secluded	spaces.		But	the	bottom	
line	is	that	if	secluded	pockets	exist	they	are	limited	in	time	and	subject	matter	and	are	followed	




















Member	 States	 and	 by	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 with	 the	 facilitation	 of	 the	 Commission,	 of	
incremental	 steps	 towards	 genuine	 interinstitutional	 reform	 in	 the	 legislative	 sphere.	 The	
challenge	of	 getting	 the	EU	 legislative	procedure	under	 control	demands	no	 less	–	a	 visible	and	
accountable	legislative	handshake	that	no	longer	takes	place	hiding	in	the	shadows	of	the	twilight	
zone	but	 in	 the	special	and	emerging	 light	of	dawn.	Transparency	 is	a	necessary	but	 insufficient	
condition	 in	 and	 of	 itself	 of	 accountability.	 Citizens,	 civil	 society	 groups,	 the	 media	 and	 other	
stakeholders	 can	 use	 transparency	 to	 trigger	 fire-alarms	 that	 in	 turn	 can	 publicly	 engage	
parliamentary	participation	(both	European	and	national)	in	a	timely	and	constructive	fashion.	The	
task	of	buiding	a	European	wide	democracy	calls	for	no	less.	
	
	
	
